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INTRODUCTION 
Following the Sandinista victory in July 1979, Nicaragua developed 
close ties with the Soviet Union and its satellites. Tracing the develop-
ment of relations with the European Communist states will enable one to 
speculate concerning why such ties advanced. It is the contention of this 
paper that these relations grew in response to challenges, both internal 
and external, and in a timely fashion, given the Reagan administration's 
efforts to destabilize the revolutionary regime. 
SOVIET-NICARAGUAN RELATIONS 
Nicaragua's Soviet ties can be considered under three categories of 
relations: economic, military, and international. The first of these, 
economic relations, can be divided into three components: emergency 
aid, economic and technical assistance, and trade. 
Nicaraguan-USSR relations have been highly developed in economic 
and technical assistance. On October 18, 1979, the day diplomatic rela-
tions were formalized, the Soviet ambassador proposed several long term 
economic agreements. Interestingly, while these pacts were offered in 
1979, they would not be signed until 1981 awaiting, perhaps, the laun-
ching of the U.S. economic "boycott." ' Prior to the promulgation of the 
agreement, however, Soviet economic and technical cooperation had 
already begun. In 1980, for example, the Nicaraguan technicians were 
already training in the USSR, and Soviet research vessels were surveying 
ocean resources, as geologists explored Nicaragua's mineral resources. 
Also, TASS technicians had begun to advise the Nicaraguan govern-
ment's media organs.2 
In April 1981, seemingly in response to the Reagan administration's 
punitive economic policies, the first economic-technical pacts were for-
malized. Among the first to be signed was a fishing and ocean resources 
agreement which called for the training of Nicaraguan technicians as well 
as establishment of research and repair facilities. By the end of 1981, 
several other pacts had been signed including one to enhance the develop-
ment of radio and television services. A second aspect of Soviet 
economic assistance commenced in September 1981 when the USSR pro-
vided $50 million in concessionary trade credits to finance the importa-
tion of Soviet heavy machinery.3 
During 1982, following the Reagan administration's unleashing of 
CIA-supported contras, Soviet assistance increased dramatically. A large 
part of the increase occurred in May when Daniel Ortega led a sizeable 
delegation of government and FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation 
Front) officials to Moscow and signed several pacts worth an estimated 
$166.8 million (U.S.). While no balance of payments assistance was 
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forthcoming, these agreements called for the construction of two 
hydroelectric plants and a 400-bed hospital, an additional $100 million in 
trade credits, and the installation of radio transmitters and a ground-
based telecommunications receiver (similar to one just installed in Cuba) 
that would link Nicaragua with the Soviet Inter-Sputnik system. An im-
portant part of the new agreements was a joint Soviet-Bulgarian project 
to develop a deep-water port at El Bluff and an inland waterway system 
utilizing the Rio Escondido to Rama. In addition, the USSR provided a 
grant of $31 million to help develop small industry. To carry out these 
projects, the Soviets sent numerous scientists and technicians.4 During 
1983, a major new project was the construction of a drydock in San Juan 
del Sur to be used by the Soviet tuna fleet.3 
Soviet donations of educational, health and food assistance, a ma-
jor aspect of economic relations, began arriving shortly after the FSLN 
victory. During 1980, the Soviets assisted Nicaragua in its educational 
endeavors by providing scholarships and material assistance to the 
literacy campaign. Donations to the latter included 10,000 pairs of shoes, 
boots, and glasses, 20,000 notebooks, 1,000 radios and the loan of two 
helicopters and crews which were used to ferry supplies to the instructors 
serving in the hinterlands of Nicaragua.6 By 1981, USSR donations to 
Nicaragua's education programs were considerable with Soviet construc-
tion of vocational schools in Leôn, Matagalpa and Managua, and 
scholarships reaching three hundred in number.7 During 1982, scholar-
ships increased to 1,000, thirty of which were utilized for the training of 
math professors.' By 1983, Soviet educational aid included a direct con-
tribution to the Nicaraguan educational fund.' 
Unlike USSR educational aid, Soviet medical assistance remained 
small, growing only in response to the floods of May 1982. The first 
Soviet medical donations arrived in October 1979. On that occasion and 
again in May and September 1981, the USSR donated millions of vac-
cinations.10 In response to the flood disaster, the Soviets sent $30 million 
in emergency relief, including both medical equipment and personnel. 
Thirty medical professionals, a field hospital, medicines and other equip-
ment arrived on a Soviet airlift early in June. The USSR also donated 
emergency assistance to the Red Cross." 
The Soviet Union contributed large quantities of food as well. 
Beginning in spring 1981, when the Reagan administration halted U.S. 
government financing of wheat sales to Nicaragua, the USSR began ship-
ping wheat. By June 1984, the total of these shipments had reached 
50,000 tons.12 
Nicaragua and the Soviets also established trade relations. From 
1980 to 1984 trade increased dramatically. While both Nicaraguan ex-
ports to the USSR and Soviet exports to Nicaragua have grown, the latter 
exceeded the former by a wide margin. In fact, Nicaragua's trading posi-
tion with the USSR and Eastern Europe deteriorated from a $23 million 
surplus in 1980 to a $28 million deficit in 1982.13 This trend increased in 
January 1984 when the Soviets delivered 10,000 barrels of aviation fuel 
and 15,000 barrels of kerosene to Corinto, while 240,000 barrels of 
Soviet crude were expected at Puerto Sandino.14 
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Nicaragua's exports to the Soviet Union began in January 1980 with 
the initiation of coffee sales. Later that year and again in 1981 
Nicaraguan trade delegations visited to USSR to promote increased ex-
change. By fall 1981, their efforts were rewarded when Nicaragua began 
importing large quantities of Soviet machinery, a trend which continued 
in 1982." 
Much of the Soviet imports is financed by concessionary trade 
credits. Between 1979 and December 1983, these credits amounted to 
$215.9 million. Soviet terms of trade for the credits were concessionary, 
ranging between 2.5 and 5 percent interest, with a repayment period of 
from ten to twenty-five years. Some credit arrangements included grace 
periods of up to five years." 
By fall 1983, the Soviets claimed to have placed a hold on conces-
sionary credits to Nicaragua. In fact, the trade credits projected for the 
three year period 1983-85, $100 million, were less than half of the 
amount extended during the four year period 1979-82. Perhaps this 
reflects the difficulty Nicaragua would have in repaying larger sums, as 
evidenced in its debt payment suspension with its neighbors and Mexico 
and Venezuela. A Soviet decision to cut back would have caused dismay 
among the Sandanists who had repeatedly requested more credits.17 
The USSR and Nicaragua developed extensive military relations. 
Prior to the launching of the contra war, there had been significant 
military aid. Most evident were shipments of East German military 
transport (trucks) numbering about 1,000, and the arrival of hundreds of 
Cuban military advisers and East German police advisers, plus the train-
ing of pilots in Bulgaria on advanced aircraft. What attracted attention 
in Washington in the months before the contra war was 1) the training of 
the pilots, and 2) the arrival in Cuba of seventeen advanced MiGs, 
leading to the speculation that Cuba might be about to transfer some of 
her older MiG 21s to Nicaragua, something that was totally unacceptable 
to the U.S. administration. USSR military involvement expanded con-
siderably. Defence Minister Humberto Ortega met with Marshal Ustinov 
in Moscow in December 1981," though nothing of the meeting was 
published or announced in the media of either country. According to the 
U.S. State Department, Soviet vessels brought 10,000 tons of armaments 
each year, including tanks, anti-aircraft guns, armored cars, artillery and 
other ordnance. It is important to note that these arms were not 
altogether gratis, as payment was sometimes made in hard currency." 
Shipments sent between 1979 and 1982 have been valued at $125 million 
by U.S. intelligence sources.20 During 1983, Soviet military aid increased 
dramatically, as arms shipments doubled, reaching 20,000 tons for the 
year. 
Nicaragua's international relations with the USSR grew as well. By 
October 1979, the Soviet ambassador was urging the FSLN to establish 
ties as rapidly as possible with the USSR and the Sandinists responded 
with calls of their own for closer relations. The Union of Journalists of 
Nicaragua was admitted to the communist International Organization of 
Journalists (along with their Ethiopian and Kampuchean counterparts) 
in November 1979.21 Three Sandinist decisions in 1980 reflected the 
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rapprochement. First, in the U.N. and other international forums, the 
Sandinists abstained on the question of the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan. Second, the CRN refused to admit Solidarity spokesper-
sons and took the Soviet-Cuban line in its press treatment of the Polish 
labor movement. And finally, there was an agreement between the USSR 
and Nicaragua to institute regular flights by Aeroflot." 
During 1981 the FSLN made direct political contacts for the first 
time with the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU). Bayardo Arce, for exam-
ple, met with the Konstantin Chernenko in October 1981.23 In winter 
1981, a delegation from the FSLN participated (as a "front") in the 
twenty-sixth annual meeting of the CPSU Central Committee, an occur-
rence which Ambassador Schliopnikov declared (incorrectly) to be un-
precedented in Soviet history. Later in October, Bayardo Arce, in charge 
of creating the Sandinist political party, returned to the Soviet Union for 
additional talks with the CPSU.24 As such party-to-party ties developed, 
some FSLN leaders openly claimed that the Sandinist revolution was bas-
ed on Marxist-Leninist principles. 
During 1982, the political committee of the FSLN held additional 
meetings with the CPSU and other Sandinist leaders proclaimed their 
commitment to Marxism-Leninism. It is worth noting that Hugh Torres, 
Head of the Political Leadership of the Popular Sandinista Army, made 
such claims most vigorously on the eve of the major trek to Moscow in 
May 1982, during which the Soviets granted Nicaragua sizeable aid. 
Moreover, the official slogan launched for May Day 1982 declared that 
Nicaragua favored "the construction of socialism." Consider, for exam-
ple, the $50 million in trade credits of September 1981 that followed the 
August 1981 proclamation, and, also, the $166.8 million pact of May 
1982 that followed a similar proclamation in April. This pattern suggests 
that Soviet aid may have been facilitated by the Sandinist commitment to 
socialism.25 
There were other signs in 1982-83 of growing relations between 
Nicaragua and the USSR. In March 1982 the two nations signed an 
agreement to establish additional Soviet consulates and to facilitate the 
acquisition of travel visas. Moreover, prior to the May 1982 Moscow 
visit, the FSLN affiliated its mass youth, women's and labor organiza-
tions with their respective Soviet-sponsored international bodies. In ad-
dition, the Sandinist press supported the Soviets in the KAL incident, 
while Nicaragua abstained on the U.S. vote.26 There can be little doubt 
that the FSLN party saw itself as "fraternally" linked to the CPSU, as 
well as to its Cuban counterpart.27 
NICARAGUA'S RELATIONS WITH THE COMECON STATES 
Next in importance were relations with Bulgaria, though they did 
not develop until 1980. It appeared, in fact, that Bulgaria would play a 
major role in Nicaragua, in harmony with the USSR, just as it had in 
Cuba.28 Nicaragua's Bulgarian relations developed much as those with 
the USSR, including economic, military and international aspects. In the 
case of Bulgaria, economic relations may be subdivided into three 
elements: donations, economic-technical cooperation and trade. 
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During the summer of 1980, Bulgaria sent medical donations worth 
$500,000. Later that year a protocol was signed establishing a framework 
for future donations and other assistance. During 1981, Bulgarian dona-
tions grew to $20 million. Economic-technical cooperation also com-
menced in 1981, and two major cooperation pacts were signed. The first 
provided for the construction and maintenance of a dam on the Yeye 
River, while the other established joint Nicaraguan-Bulgarian enterprises 
in the canning and leather industries, raised the number of scholarships, 
and increased the level of trade credits." By 1981, another agreement 
was reached providing technical assistance to the food processing in-
dustry and Bulgaria sent wheat in response to the U.S. credit freeze. Dur-
ing 1982, the two states signed cooperation pacts in April, May, June and 
July, allocating technical assistance to agriculture, the fishing, forestry 
and mining industries, providing for equipment deliveries, a $10 million 
loan to the telecommunications industry, and the financing of the joint 
Bulgarian-Soviet construction project to develop a deep water port and 
inland waterway from El Bluff to Rama. Then, during 1983, yet another 
cooperation agreement was signed substantially increasing assistance, in-
cluding a trade credit of $140 million to be spread over 1983-85.30 
Nicaragua and Bulgaria established trade relations in 1980. By 
January, Nicaragua had begun exporting coffee to Bulgaria and in 
1981-82 the latter reciprocated with canned goods. These and other com-
modities were financed by trade credits which by the end of 1982 had 
reached $37 million. In March 1983, the two countries signed a new trade 
agreement.31 
Further, Bulgaria, as had the USSR, began military training pro-
grams. During 1982 the Reagan administration became preoccupied by 
reports of Nicaraguan pilots training in Bulgaria. In 1983 military 
assistance included the training of additional pilots and the transport of 
arms from communist countries.32 
Nicaraguan-Bulgarian international relations included direct con-
tacts between the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) and the FSLN, as 
well as intergovernmental discussions.33 Bayardo Arce met with 
representatives of the BCP in 1980 and 1981. In December 1980, a BCP 
delegation met in Nicaragua with the Political Committee of the FSLN 
and members of the GRN. In October 1981, Arce visited with represen-
tatives of the BCP in Bulgaria. Then in late 1981, yet another BCP 
delegation met with the FSLN in Nicaragua.34 Just as the Sandinists 
established firm ties with the Cuban and Soviet ruling parties, they met 
as frequently with the Bulgarian Party.35 These frequent party-to-party 
contacts tend to cast doubt on the possibility of the FSLN pursuing the 
"Mexican path" in the future. 
Soon after the victory of 1979, Nicaragua established relations with 
the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Though the GDR provided 
immediate medical aid for seriously wounded Sandinists, Nicaragua's 
relations with that country were primarily economic and intergovern-
mental. Economic relations with the GDR, like those with the USSR, 
may be divided into three categories: donations, economic-technical 
cooperation and trade. 
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East German donations began arriving in August 1979, with a ship-
ment of medical supplies valued at one million marks. By 1981, GDR 
donations had reached $100 million, part of which came in the form of 
wheat shipments commencing in 1981 in response to the U.S. credit 
freeze. Another portion of the total represented educational aid. The 
GDR contributed $1 million in June, 1982, following the floods. In 1983, 
GDR donations included the installation of an electronics workshop and 
a Christmas gift of 40,000 tons of toys." 
The German Democratic Republic began its economic and technical 
cooperation with Nicaragua soon after the first donations arrived. In 
early September 1979, the GDR pledged to construct textile factories in 
Nicaragua. During 1981, economic -technical cooperation increased with 
the signing of three more cooperation pacts, in three areas: public health, 
transportation and education.37 Trade relations with the GDR commenc-
ed in 1980, when Nicaragua began importing trucks and exporting cof-
fee.38 In addition, Nicaragua held intergovernmental discussions with 
GDRCP chief Honecker and other officials on several occasions.3' 
Nicaragua developed relations with Hungary in 1980, though these 
have been limited to economic ties and intergovernmental discussions. 
Hungarian economic aid to Nicaragua was of two types: donations and 
economic-technical cooperation. In September 1980, Hungary provided 
a number of scholarships. By 1981, $5 million in donations had arrived, 
some destined for the mining industry.40 Economic and technical 
cooperation began when a team of public health and regional planning 
experts arrived.41 Intergovernmental discussions also commenced in 
1981, and have been held annually since.42 
Relations with Poland and Romania were initiated during 1980. As 
of 1983, these were limited to trade, with coffee exports beginning in 
1980.43 Romania was supplying police cars to Nicaragua by 1983.44 
Relations with Czechoslovakia began in 1981 as economic, military, 
and international relations developed with the CSSR. Economic relations 
involved donations, economic and technical cooperation, and trade. The 
CSSR made several contributions amounting to $35 million in 1981, and 
donations continued in 1983.49 Czech economic-technical assistance also 
started in 1981. As of 1982, two major economic-technical pacts had 
been signed, one in May 1981 and another in January 1982.46 
Nicaraguan-CSSR trade also began during 1981. By December, the 
Czechs had financed $40 million in exports, including heavy production 
equipment, trucks and textile plants. During 1982-83 additional exports 
were financed, with the terms formalized in agreements of January 1982 
and July 1983.47 
Czech military relations resulted in both the arming and training of 
the Popular Sandinista Army. The program began in 1981 when thirty-
five Nicaraguans received flight training in the CSSR. In 1983, the 
Czechs sent several SL 39 pilot trainers,48 and arms shipments followed 
with the Nicaraguan army receiving new Czech rifles.4' International 
relations had progressed by December 1981 to the point where a consular 
agreement eliminated the need for travel visas.50 In both 1982 and 1983 




Nicaragua's relations with Yugoslavia were limited to economic and 
intergovernmental relations. Yugoslavia provided economic assistance 
by offering a $40 million loan, to help the struggling state through its 
debt crisis, and by assisting in the development of Nicaragua's 
agriculture, especially its corn production. Intergovernmental discus-
sions with Yugoslavia occurred in 1979, 1980 and 1982." 
THE QUANTITATIVE DIMENSION SUMMARIZED 
The GRN reported that by July 1982, 18 percent of its loans had 
come from the "Soviet bloc," while by December 1982,11.9 percent and 
7.7 percent of exports were tied to "bloc" states." These totals appear 
low in light of the extensive projects and programs noted in this essay. 
One explanation would be that Cuban aid and trade, as well as all 
military and security training and supplies, were excluded from these 
figures. Moreover, donations, technical assistance and aid other than 
loans were excluded as well, though it may be questioned whether Cuban 
aid is actually Cuban-generated or rather simply Soviet aid by proxy. It 
seems, however, that the former is indeed the case and appears to consist 
entirely of donations, both of material and manpower, as well as 
weapons. Of course, it must be noted that the weapons may have been 
replaced in Cuba through Soviet sources so that the transfer could be 
facilitated. Nonetheless, Cuba seems to be the best friend Nicaragua has 
yet found. This is illustrated by Commandante Bayardo Arce in a speech 
to a group of Cuban and Nicaraguan officials in January 1984: 
In 4½ years ... Cuba has sent 2,000 teachers each year 
and a total of 1,500 doctors who have provided five 
million medical consultations, performed 65,000 opera-
tions and delivered 30,000 babies .... Cuba has also lent 
assistance in the mining, fishing, forestry and sugar in-
dustries, road construction, food production and other 
areas including military affairs ... friendship with Cuba 
is not negotiable ....54 
Obviously, Cuba's "internationalism" has found a client in the Western 
hemisphere. 
Our survey of promised economic assistance to Nicaragua by eleven 
Communist states during 1979-83 resulted in a surprising total value of 
$1,216,450,000. Broken down into categories, the figures (in millions) 
were $451 in economic aid, $423.9 in concessionary trade credits, 
$193.75 in donations, $81 in non-trade related loans, and $66.8 in 
technical assistance. These are often long-term projects and programs ex-
tending at least through 1985, and it is suspected that much of the fun-
ding had not yet been expended by 1984. The absence of hard currency to 
assist in meeting Nicaragua's balance of payments problem with the 
West is also notable. 
Economic assistance totals for 1979-83 resulting from our survey for 
eleven Communist states were (in millions), in rank order: USSR $443.7, 
Cuba $286, Bulgaria $232.5, the GDR $103.25, Czechoslovakia $75, 
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Yugoslavia $40, the DPRK $31, and Hungary $5. In the cases of Poland, 
Romania and the People's Republic of China, no actual values were 
reported. The total for the seven states traditionally defined as the 
"Soviet bloc" was $859.45 million.55 
As of 1984, Nicaragua had little reason to expect direct Soviet 
military support in case of a U.S. invasion — the Communist state had 
made that clear.56 How much credit and economic assistance the Com-
munist states would provide remained to be seen. Nicaragua's growing 
external indebtedness (up from $1.6 billion in 1979 to over $3.4 billion in 
1984) could result in repayment postponements, as occurred in the 
Cuban case. According to available figures, at least $524.9 million was 
owed to the Communist states in 1984. The Council of Mutual Economic 
Assistance (COMECON) appeared ready in spring 1984 to embark upon 
programs and projects in Nicaragua whose cost could rise substantially 
in the future.57 By spring 1984, then, all indications were that the limits 
of Communist state support for Nicaragua had by no means been reach-
ed. 
Author's Note 
* The authors wish to thank Praeger Publishers, New York, for permission to include 
passages from our chapter in Nicaragua: The First Five Years, ed. by Thomas W. 
Walker, c. 1985. 
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